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Introduction
After the global financial crisis and the Great 
Recession, a large and growing body of 
literature has examined real business-financial 
cycle linkages. To this end, Claessens et al. 
(2012) examined a large database of business 
and financial stress periods, corroborating that 
financial crisis periods are often longer and 
deeper than economic recessions and tend to 
amplify and prolong the latter. Our research aims 
EM_4_2020.indd   152 18.11.2020   12:28:18
1534, XXIII, 2020
Finance
to contribute to an understanding of the financial 
stress-macroeconomy nexus by studying the 
spillovers of US (euro area) financial stress 
shocks and their macroeconomic effects (i.e. 
effects on industrial production, inflation and 
unemployment) into the euro area (USA). This 
paper asks whether these effects are contingent 
on the phase of the business cycle.
Traditionally, domestic and international 
financial stress-business cycle linkages have 
been investigated within the linear modelling 
framework. Recently, the linear framework 
has been criticized by authors employing non-
linear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models (Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 
2011; Mittnik & Semmler, 2012, 2013; Schleer 
& Semmler, 2014; Boissay et al., 2013; Chen 
& Semmler, 2014) for their limited power to 
explain the differential macroeconomic effects 
of financial shocks in different regimes of the 
economy. This literature contends that under 
high financial stress or recessionary regimes 
the economy could function differently than 
in low financial stress or non-recessionary 
regimes. It identifies several amplification 
mechanisms which can switch the economy 
from one regime to another. Our research 
builds on the framework of this line of research.
To the best of our knowledge, only Evgenidis 
and Tsagkanos (2017) and Chen and Semmler 
(2018) have investigated the regime-dependent 
macroeconomic effects of the international 
transmission of financial stress shocks. Both 
studies used the financial stress index for the 
USA as a threshold variable and explained 
how the euro area economy responds to US 
financial stress shocks, conditional on the US 
financial stress regime. The literature does 
not show how financial stress shocks are 
transmitted between the two major economies, 
based on the domestic business cycle regime. 
We assert that an answer to this question is 
relevant for policymaking and aim to fill this gap 
in the literature.
Our research also extends the literature 
that uses the Composite Indicator of Systemic 
Stress (CISS), constructed by Holló et al. 
(2012) and maintained by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). The CISS aggregates various 
stress indicators of five major segments of 
the financial system (financial intermediaries, 
money markets, bond markets, equity markets 
and foreign exchange markets) based on their 
time-varying co-movements (further details 
are given in the Appendix). As the latter are 
stronger when the stress is elevated in several 
segments of the financial system, this indicator 
is considered to capture the materialization 
of systemic risk (Holló et al., 2012; Kremer, 
2016a, 2016b). As such, it has a “substantial 
and robust explanatory power for standard 
macroeconomic variables” (Kremer, 2016b), as 
demonstrated in various research applications 
(e.g. Holló et al., 2012; Kremer, 2016a, 2016b; 
Adam & Benecká, 2013).
Furthermore, we complement the existing 
literature by explicitly including the labour 
market response to spillovers of a financial 
stress shock. The literature on the financial-real 
sector nexus has largely neglected the effect of 
a financial stress on unemployment. Related 
literature on the international transmission of 
uncertainty shocks, however, illustrates that the 
relationship is non-linear (Morley & Piger, 2012; 
Caggiano et al., 2014, 2017). This is due to 
uncertainty shocks provoking a stronger surge 
in the unemployment rate during recessions 
than in non-recessions.
The empirical research in the paper is 
based on the Bayesian threshold VAR (TVAR) 
modelling framework. Recessionary and non-
recessionary regimes during period 1999M1–
2017M11 are determined by the model 
and then the non-linearity of transmission 
of international financial stress shocks to 
macroeconomic variables (industrial production 
growth, inflation, and unemployment) is studied 
by generalized impulse responses. The results 
show significant transmission of US financial 
stress shocks to euro area, and non-linearities 
in the transmission.
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 1 reviews the existing literature, 
while Section 2 describes the methodology. 
Section 3 presents the data and empirical 
results, Section 4 discusses the results and the 
final section summarizes the main findings.
1. Literature Review
One strand in the empirical literature on 
financial stress-business cycle linkages uses 
linear vector autoregression (VAR) models to 
illustrate the destabilizing effects of financial 
stress shocks on the macroeconomy (e.g. 
Hakkio & Keeton, 2009; Gilchrist & Zakrajsek, 
2012; Kremer, 2016a). Another strand in the 
empirical literature also applies linear modelling 
to show that financial stress (or stress in some 
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segment of the financial system, e.g., the credit 
market) originating in one country can spill 
abroad and cause detrimental macroeconomic 
developments (Helbling et al., 2011; Dovern & 
van Roye, 2014; Eickmeier & Ng, 2015; Ha et 
al., 2017). Theoretical underpinnings of such 
empirical modelling of business and financial 
cycle linkages can be found in financial 
accelerator models (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; 
Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Gertler et al., 2007; 
Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2010).
In financial accelerator models, financial 
stress shocks exacerbate negative economic 
developments. The effects, however, are mean-
reverting. As argued by Schleer and Semmler 
(2014), this is because the financial-real sector 
interactions are modelled as linear. In non-
linear DSGE models the amplifying effects 
of financial stress shocks are asymmetric or 
regime-dependent: while they are strong and 
more durable when the economy is under 
a regime of high financial stress or recession, 
they are small or insignificant when the financial 
system or economy is in a non-crisis regime 
(Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2011; Mittnik & 
Semmler, 2012, 2013; Schleer & Semmler, 
2014; Hubrich & Tetlow, 2015).
A key role in the switch from a normal to 
a crisis regime in non-linear DSGE models 
is played by banks’ balance sheets and 
various amplification mechanisms. In the 
model of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011), 
upon an exogenous shock to the financial 
system, large destabilizing effects and regime 
shifts (amplification) can be the result of an 
endogenous response concerning asset prices 
due to precautionary savings and volatility. 
Other amplification mechanisms can also be 
at work, e.g., movements in risk premia and 
credit spreads (Mittnik & Semmler, 2012, 2013), 
interplay between risk premia, credit constraints 
and extensive deleveraging of borrowers (Chen 
& Semmler, 2014), a wealth reducing effect on 
consumption and investment when asset prices 
fall, or a “diabolic loop” in the interplay between 
private borrowers, banks and sovereign debt 
(Schleer & Semmler, 2014).
The empirical literature exploring non-
linearities in the dynamic relationship 
between domestic financial stress and the 
macroeconomy is relatively thin and, in general, 
supports the theoretical prediction of non-
linearity. Classical TVAR (Mittnik & Semmler, 
2013; Schleer & Semmler, 2014; Mittnik & 
Semmler, 2014; Chen & Semmler, 2014), 
Bayesian Markov-switching VAR (Aboura & van 
Roe, 2017; Hartmann et al., 2013), or Bayesian 
TVAR (Alessandri & Mumtaz, 2017; Chatterjee 
et al., 2017) modelling approaches are applied, 
while (generalized) impulse responses are 
computed to infer structural relationships 
between the variables. Most studies set the 
financial stress indicator as a threshold variable. 
However, Mittnik and Semmler (2012) study the 
effect of financial stress shocks on economic 
activity during low and high financial stress 
regimes, whereas Chatterjee et al. (2017) 
focus on recessionary and non-recessionary 
regimes. Although most researchers design 
a parsimonious bivariate model, some authors 
include up to three additional macroeconomic 
variables in their model (Alessandri & Mumtaz, 
2017; Hartmann et al., 2013; Chatterjee et al., 
2017), including the inflation rate, the monetary 
policy or short-term interest rate, growth 
in loans, or growth in the nominal effective 
exchange rate.
A variety of financial stress indices are 
used: the IMF Financial Stress Index (Mittnik & 
Semmler, 2012, 2013; Chen & Semmler, 2014), 
the ZEW Financial Condition Index (Schleer 
& Semmler, 2014), the Chicago Fed Financial 
Conditions Index (Alessandri & Mumtaz, 2017), 
the CISS (Hartmann et al., 2013) or self-
constructed indices (Aboura & van Roye, 2017; 
Chatterjee et al., 2017).
There are numerous studies that explore 
the non-linear response in industrial production 
growth to a financial stress. Across a variety 
of studied countries, they find an asymmetric 
response in industrial production growth to 
a positive shock in financial stress. Mittnik 
and Semmler (2012) studied major European 
countries (excluding the UK and France), 
Mittnik and Semmler (2013) looked at the USA, 
Germany, Italy and France, Alessandri and 
Mumtaz (2017) considered the USA, Chatterjee 
et al. (2017) examined the UK, Aboura and van 
Roye (2017) investigated France, Chen and 
Semmler (2014) addressed 15 OECD countries, 
Schleer and Semmler (2014) reviewed 10 
major euro area countries, and Hartmann et al. 
(2013) approached the euro area as a whole. 
They overwhelmingly reported a significant, 
regime-dependent drop in production growth in 
response to a financial stress shock. In general, 
the reduction is larger in recessionary or high 
financial stress regimes. For example, Mittnik 
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and Semmler (2013) estimated the response 
to be 2.5 times stronger and Alessandri and 
Mumtaz (2017) even reported a sixfold stronger 
response in the recession/high stress regime in 
the USA. Additionally, Hartmann et al. (2013) 
find a negative response in the inflation rate, 
growth in loans and interest rate for the euro 
area in a high stress regime.
Beyond the literature on dynamic 
relationship between domestic financial stress 
and the broader economy, several channels of 
international financial stress transmission have 
been identified, including the trade channel 
(financial stress shocks are more likely to be 
transmitted and affect the economic activity of 
countries that mutually trade more), financial 
market integration (the capital market and 
global operation of banks), global shocks, and 
contagion (see Apostolakis & Papadopoulos, 
2014; Dovern & van Roye, 2014, and references 
therein).
As already noted, only Evgenidis and 
Tsagkanos (2017) and Chen and Semmler 
(2018) investigate the regime-dependent 
effects of the international transmission of 
financial stress shocks. Chen and Semmler 
(2018) apply a bivariate (the IMF’s Financial 
Stability Index and industrial production growth) 
global VAR (GVAR) model to investigate the 
effects of financial stress shocks originating 
in the USA (as a case of a large country) and 
Belgium (as a small country) on financial stress 
and industrial production growth in 15 OECD 
countries. The impulse responses show that, 
in a high financial stress regime, a financial 
stress shock in the USA leads to a statistically 
significant increase in the domestic financial 
stress in five countries. This contrasts with only 
one country for Belgium. Under a high stress 
regime at home, industrial production decreases 
significantly only for one country due to a US 
financial stress shock and none in the case of 
Belgium. In contrast, under a low stress regime, 
a financial stress shock in the USA and Belgium 
significantly increases domestic financial stress 
indices in all observed countries. However, the 
responses of domestic industrial production 
growth are not significant across all countries.
Evgenidis and Tsagkanos (2017) analysed 
the international transmission of financial 
stress shocks from the USA to the euro area 
by specifying a model with several endogenous 
variables (including industrial production, capital 
flows, short-term interest rate and financial 
stress index) and a set of exogenous variables 
(including proxies for uncertainty in the USA 
and the euro area, gold prices, stock market 
prices, commodity prices, and expectations 
about future inflation). Their results indicate 
that, under a high financial stress regime in 
the USA, a positive shock (i.e. increase) to US 
financial stress is detrimental to the euro area’s 
economic activity, interest rate and financial 
stress. The responses are not significant under 
a low stress regime.
Besides the differences noted in the 
introduction, our paper differs from the 
studies of Chen and Semmler (2018) and 
Evgenidis and Tsagkanos (2017) in several 
other important ways. First, both studies 
use a financial stress index as the threshold 
variable. The economies investigated in these 
studies are thus either in a high or in a low 
financial stress regime. Following Chatterjee 
et al. (2018) and Chen and Semmler (2014), 
the threshold variable in our paper is growth in 
domestic industrial production. Conditional on 
the threshold value, the considered economy 
is thus in either a recessionary (low growth) 
or a non-recessionary regime. We, thus, can 
answer different questions to those in the 
referenced studies. Second, in Chen and 
Semmler (2018), a bivariate TVAR is applied, 
while Evgenidis and Tsagkanos (2017) consider 
several endogenous and exogenous variables. 
We estimate a five-variable TVAR model in 
which, as commonly found in the literature, all 
variables are endogenous. Third, Evgenidis 
and Tsagkanos (2017) use different financial 
stress indicators for economies: the St. Louis 
Fed Financial Stress Index for the USA and the 
CISS for the euro area. As there are certain 
differences in the construction of different 
financial stress indicators (for a review, see 
Kliesen et al., 2012), we find it important to use 
indicators constructed by employing the same 
methodology, especially if the research aims 
to examine regime-dependent international 
stress spillovers (shock in foreign financial 
stress spilling over into domestic financial 
stress) and the transmission of financial stress 
shocks. Fourth, while the referenced studies 
apply a classical TVAR, we resort to Bayesian 
methods in TVAR estimation and inference, 
which is advantageous over classical maximum 
likelihood methods in estimation and inference 
(impulse response analysis) (see Koop & 
Potter, 1999; Kwon, 2003).
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2. Methodology
To explore the USA-euro area financial 
stress spillovers and their regime-contingent 
macroeconomic effects, we employ a Bayesian 
TVAR model. As noted by Alessandri and 
Mumtaz (2017), a TVAR is capable of capturing 
a structural break associated with financial or 
economic crises. Another useful feature of the 
model is that the threshold variable is one of the 
endogenous variables in the model and that the 
threshold value which switches the economy 
from one regime to another is determined by 
the data and not subjectively by the researcher.
To study the financial stress spillovers from 
the USA in recessionary and non-recessionary 
regimes in the euro area, we apply the following 




where t =1, …,T, Xt = [ytEA, utEA, πtEA, cisstUS, 
cisstEA]T is a vector of endogenous variables 
consisting of several domestic (euro area) 
variables and one foreign (US) variable. In this 
we follow several recent studies on the effects 
of international spillovers of uncertainty shocks 
on macroeconomy (e.g. Caggiano et al., 2017; 
Fontaine et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2018). The 
euro area variables included are the annual, i.e., 
year-on-year, growth in industrial production 
(see, e.g., Hartmann et al., 2013; Kremer, 
2016a) (ytEA), unemployment rate (utEA), 
annual inflation (πtEA), and (systemic) financial 
stress level in the euro area (cisstEA). The US 
variable is the US financial stress (cisstUS). zt–d is 
a threshold variable; d is threshold lag; z* is the 
unknown threshold value; c1 (c2, respectively) 
is a regime-specific 5 × 1 vector of constants; 
p is the lag length of the TVAR; A1,i (A2,i, 
respectively) is the regime-specific matrix of 
coefficients for lag i. e1t (e2t, respectively) is a 
5 × 1 vector of i.i.d. regime-specific errors (see 
Chen & Lee, 1995). The threshold variable in 
(1a), zt–d, is the d-th lag of ytEA.
Financial stress spillovers from the euro 
area into the USA and their macroeconomic 
effects in recessionary and non-recessionary 
regimes of the US economy are studied by 
an identical model with a slightly different 
endogenous vector, i.e., Xt:
 
(1b)
where Xt = [ytUS, utUS, πtUS, cisstUS, cisstEA]T; and ytUS, 
utUS and πtUS refer to annual growth in industrial 
production, unemployment rate and inflation in 
the USA. The threshold variable in (1b), zt–d, is 
the d-th lag of ytUS.
Depending on zt–d, the economy described 
by (1a) and (1b) is thus endogenously labelled 
as being in a recessionary regime when 
zt–d ≤ z*, or in a non-recessionary regime when 
(zt–d > z*). Note that this definition of recessions 
dating may differ from those, e.g., of the NBER 
and the CEPR, which observe quarterly real 
GDP growth and several other economic 
variables in order to identify business cycle 
turning points. The model is piece-wise (within-
regime) linear. Each row of (1a) and (1b) thus 
describes a regime-specific VAR model. The 
model, however, is non-linear in time (Chen & 
Lee, 1995).
Following the commonly used approach, the 
lag, p, of Models (1a) and (1b) is determined by 
applying the Akaike information criteria to the 
linear VAR model (limiting the maximum lag (p) 
of 12):
, (2)
where Xt is as defined above for (1a) and (1b), 
respectively; c is a 5 × 1 vector of regression 
constants; Ai is a matrix of coefficients for lag i; 
and et is a 5 × 1 vector of i.i.d. errors.
After determining the lag order, Models (1a) 
and (1b) are estimated by Bayesian methods, 
applying the approach of Alessandri and 
Mumtaz (2017) who follow Sims and Zha (1998) 
and Banbura et al. (2010). More specifically, we 
use the same normal inverse Wishart prior for 
estimating the regime-specific VAR parameters. 
We closely follow Alessandri and Mumtaz 
(2017) and use the AR(1) estimates for the 
individual endogenous variables to obtain the 
priors, means and scaling factors. The overall 
prior is τ = 0.1, while the prior for the constant 
is set at 0.0001, and the tightness of the priors 
in the sum of coefficients is λ = 10τ. The 
prior for the threshold lag is set at a maximum 
of 4, while the prior for the threshold value is 
normally distributed, i.e., z* ~ N(z, s), where z 
is the sample mean of the threshold variable 
and s is the variance in the prior of variable zt. 
EM_4_2020.indd   156 18.11.2020   12:28:19
1574, XXIII, 2020
Finance
Conditional on the initial z* and d, the conditional 
posterior distribution of the regime-specific 
VAR coefficient is normal and the conditional 
posterior of the variance-covariance matrix is 
inverse Wishart distributed. The Gibbs sampler 
of Chen and Lee (1995) with 15,000 iterations 
and 5,000 burn-ins is used to draw the posterior 
distributions. The threshold value is drawn 
from the Metropolis Hastings step. For a more 
comprehensive description of the settings, refer 
to Alessandri and Mumtaz (2017).
Dynamic responses from macroeconomic 
variables to financial stress shocks are 
explored using the generalized impulse 
responses, i.e., non-linear impulse response 
analysis, suggested by Koop et al. (1996). The 
generalized impulse responses for a regime 
R(GIRFRt), where R = recessionary, non-
recessionary, are defined as follows (Koop et 
al., 1996; Alessandri & Mumtaz, 2017):
, (3)
where E denotes expectation; h is the time 
horizon; Φt are all the parameters of Models (1a) 
and (1b), respectively; XRt–1 is the regime-specific 
history; and η is a shock. Given the parameters 
of Models (1a) and (1b), respectively, and the 
regime-specific history, the first term on the 
right side of (3) is the conditional expectation 
of the endogenous variable under a shock 
(a one standard deviation shock concerning the 
variable of interest), while the second term is 
the conditional expectation of the endogenous 
variable with no shock. Empirically, the 
conditional expectations for a specific regime 
R are estimated by simulating the model 
(100 replications) for all possible starting 
values in that regime. Impulse responses (3) 
are then computed (by 500 Gibbs iterations) 
for all histories in the regime. Mean responses 
and the 68% confidence interval are finally 
computed. The computation is performed by 
the MATLAB codes of Alessandri and Mumtaz 
(2017). We wish to thank the authors for making 
their code available.
Structural identification of financial stress 
shocks is achieved through the Cholesky 
identification scheme, as is standard in 
the TVAR literature. Similarly, following 
the referenced literature, we place the real 
economic variables  (ytEA, utEA) and inflation 
(πtEA) first, followed by the financial variables 
(cisstUS, cisstEA). This implies that the financial 
variables are contemporaneously affected by 
real economic variables, but not the reverse. 
We place US financial stress before that of the 
euro area, as in Chen and Semmler (2018) 
and several other studies on the international 
transmission of shocks from the USA (e.g. 
Dovern & van Roye, 2014; Caggiano et al., 
2017; Huang et al., 2018). This is in line with 
the notion of the larger global impact of the US 
economy and its financial markets as compared 
to the euro area. This order is also supported 
graphically (see Fig. 1 in continuation) due to 
the fact that major financial stress events during 
the sample period, which originated in the USA, 
not only elevated financial stress in the USA, 
but also contemporaneously in the euro area, 
whereas, during a major stress event in the 
euro area (the euro debt crisis), this was not the 
case. By placing cisstUS in the penultimate place, 
we assume that systemic financial stress in the 
USA is contemporaneously affected by all euro 
area “real” macroeconomic variables (industrial 
production, unemployment, inflation), albeit 
only with a lag regarding the euro area financial 
stress. By placing cisstEA last, we assume that all 
other variables in the model contemporaneously 
affect financial stress in the euro area, whereas 
the euro area’s financial stress affects other 
variables albeit only with a lag.
3. Data and Empirical Results
The data consist of monthly observations for 
the period 1999M1–2017M11, limited at the 
start by the birth of the euro area and at the 
end by the availability of data for the variable 
cisstUS. A detailed description of all variables with 
statistical summary is contained in Tab. 1.
We can observe that the mean annual 
growth in industrial production in euro area 
was slightly (0.02 percentage points) higher 
but also more volatile than in the USA. Mean 
unemployment rate in euro area was 3.42 
percentage points higher than in the USA, but 
less volatile, while mean inflation rate in euro 
area was 0.43 percentage points lower and less 
volatile than in the USA. CISS in euro area was 
on average higher and more volatile than in the 
USA.
The dynamics of  and  and the recessionary 
regimes, as determined by (1a) and (1b), are 
presented in Fig. 1. Cleary, the financial stress 
in the euro area and in the USA during the 
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Variable 
notation Mean Max Min St. dev. Description
ytEA 0.98 9.34 −21.32 4.87
Annual growth in industrial production (percentage 
change compared to the same month in the previous 
year) for total industry, excluding construction; monthly 
frequency; calculated from the monthly seasonally 
adjusted index (2015 = 100). Data source is OECD 
(2019a).
ytUS 0.96 8.47 −15.34 4.18
utEA 9.46 12.1 7.3 1.30 Unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, 
expressed as a percentage of the active population; 
monthly frequency. Data source is Eurostat (2019).utUS 6.02 10.0 3.8 1.76
πtEA 1.75 4.12 −0.62 0.96
Inflation rate (percentage change compared to 
the same month in the previous year); monthly 
frequency; calculated from the consumer price 
index (2015 = 100). Data source is OECD (2019b).πtUS 2.18 5.6 −2.1 1.28
cisstEA 0.19 0.78 0.03 0.16
The CISS for the euro area. Monthly values are 
calculated from weekly values according to the 
arithmetic average. The CISS is constructed by 
Holló et al. (2012), maintained by the ECB and 
computed in several steps. First, three different 
financial stress measures for each of five segments 
of the financial system (financial intermediaries, 
money markets, bond markets, equity markets and 
foreign exchange markets) are collected. In the 
second step, the data on individual stress measures 
are arranged in ascending order, then transformed 
into their empirical cumulative distribution function. 
After this transformation, 15 individual stress 
factors are distributed in the interval (0.1). Next, 
the stress factors for each of the five segments are 
aggregated according to the arithmetic average 
to obtain five subindices. The final step consists 
of aggregating the subindices to a composite 
indicator of financial stress (CISS), based on the 
subindices’ weights (the most weight is carried 
by financial intermediaries and equity market 
subindices) and time-varying cross-correlations 
between the subindices. The obtained CISS 
indicator is distributed over the interval (0.1) and 
measures the “ex-post systemic stress, i.e. risk that 
has materialised already” (Holló et al., 2012). Data 
source is ECB (2019).
cisstUS 0.14 0.73 0.02 0.13
The CISS for the USA is measured by the same 
methodology as . Whereas  as well as a similar 
indicator for individual euro area countries is 
maintained by the ECB, the CISS for the USA 
was calculated by Kremer (2016b). An extended 
time series of  with a weekly frequency until 
November 10, 2017 was calculated and kindly 
shared by Manfred Kremer. Data source is Kremer 
(2016b).
Source: own
Tab. 1: Data summary and description
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observed period is strongly connected (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.872).
The CISS for the euro area and the USA 
traces out the major events that caused turmoil 
in the respective financial markets. The largest 
spikes in the CISS for both areas are associated 
with the global financial crisis and the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis. Other important events 
in the pre-global financial crisis period coincide 
with the dot-com crisis, the 9/11 terror attacks 
in the USA, and the Enron and WorldCom 
bankruptcies. Clearly, the decoupling of the 
CISS for the two areas is observable during the 
euro area’s sovereign debt crisis, implying that 
the systemic crisis was limited to the euro area. 
The financial stress in the euro area decreased 
in 2013. In the period from 2014 until mid-2016, 
a tendency of increasing stress is noticeable 
in both areas. As the ECB (2016) notes, this 
is related to the Greek bailout referendum in 
July 2015, turmoil in the Chinese stock market 
turmoil, and the uncertainty spurred by the 
Brexit referendum. In 2017, the CISS in both 
areas returned to relatively low levels, indicating 
relative financial stability.
Fig. 1 also presents recessionary regimes 
in both economies. For the euro area, 
recessions determined by Model (1a) (i.e. 
periods for which zt–d ≤ z*) successfully trace 
out the recession periods, as defined by the 
Centre for Economic Policy (CEPR). The model 
also reveals some shorter periods of industrial 
production contractions at the end of 2001 and 
2003 as recessionary. For the USA, Model (1b) 
traces out the 2001 recession and the Great 
Recession as defined by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER). Additionally, 
a slack in annual industrial production growth 
at the end of 2015 and the start of 2016 is also 
identified as recessionary by Model (1b).
Fig. 1: CISS for the euro area and the USA, financial stress events and recessionary regimes in the euro area and the USA
Source: own
Note: Both plots show the financial stress indices for the euro area (cisstEA) and the USA (cisstUS) during the period 
1999M1–2017M11. The recessionary regimes, determined by (1), are represented by the shaded areas. Major financial 
stress events in the euro area and the USA are denoted in both plots by vertical lines: burst of the dot-com bubble in 
March 2000, 9/11 terror attacks (September 2001), Enron bankruptcy (December 2001), WorldCom bankruptcy (July 
2002), BNP Paribas (investment fund redemption suspension, August 2007), Bear Sterns collapse (March 2008), Le-
hman Brothers bankruptcy (September 2008), Greece bailout (May 2010), euro area debt crisis vertex (in August 2011, 
fear of debt crisis spreading from periphery to the core euro area), Greek bailout referendum (July 2015) and Brexit 
referendum (June 2016).
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Although the presented theory suggests non-
linear modelling, testing for (non-)linearity is well 
advised (see Hubrich & Teräsvirta, 2013). By 
performing the Lagrange multiplier test of non-
linearity as developed by Teräsvirta and Yang 
(2014), the linear model (2) was rejected in favour 
of a non-linear VAR model. The null of linearity 
(Model (2)) against the non-linear specification 
in the form of a smooth transition VAR (STVAR) 
model was tested. The STVAR model, with the 
same endogenous set of variables, lag structure 
and transition variable, was estimated. The null 
of the linear VAR was rejected against the non-
linear specification (t-statistic = 146.1761 and 
p-value = 0.0018002 for the euro area model (1a); 
t-statistic = 105.0075 and p-value = 8.7848e-06 for 
the US model (1b)). We wish to thank Caggiano 
et al. (2017) for their MATLAB code for the test.
We next present the GIRFs to analyse the 
relationship between US financial stress (cisstUS) 
shocks and the macroeconomic response in the 
euro area over a horizon of 60 months from the 
shock. The GIRFs are computed by (3), based 
on the results of Model (1a). Model (1a) was 
estimated on four lags, as indicated by Akaike 
information criteria for Model (2).
The results in Fig. 2 are indicative of 
inertia in financial stress: once the USA is hit 
by a financial stress shock, the financial stress 
level increases afterwards for several months. 
They also corroborate some earlier findings 
in the literature revealing that shocks to US 
financial market stability spill over into the euro 
area financial system: a positive shock in the 
US financial stress results in a significant 
increase in the euro area’s financial stress, with 
only slight differences between the regimes.
While an unexpected increase in the US 
financial stress is detrimental to the euro area 
economy under a non-recessionary regime, it 
Fig. 2: Response of the euro area to a one standard deviation shock in cisstUS
Source: own
Note: Generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in cisstUS hitting the euro area in recessionary 
and non-recessionary periods over a 60-month horizon. Median responses and the 68% confidence interval are drawn 
(dotted lines for a non-recessionary regime and shaded areas for a recessionary regime), as is typical in Bayesian infe-
rence analysis, computed from (3), based on the results from (1a).
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even further deepens the euro area recessions. 
Upon a positive (i.e. increase) one standard 
deviation shock to the US financial stress, 
industrial production growth and inflation in the 
euro area drop (the latter in the long term), while 
the unemployment rate and the euro area financial 
stress indicator pick up. In the recessionary 
regime in the euro area, the response of 
industrial production is the most pronounced, 
contracting by up to 0.42 percentage points eight 
months after the shock. The unemployment 
rate increases by up to 0.12 percentage points 
25–30 months after the shock. The response of 
inflation is slower and more protracted, reaching 
the largest effect 37 months after the shock when 
inflation drops by 0.08 percentage points.
Under a non-recessionary regime in the 
euro area, the output responds slightly less 
strongly to the shock, implying non-linearities in 
the financial stress-business cycle interactions. 
Evgenidis and Tsagkanos (2017) and Chen and 
Semmler (2018) showed that foreign financial 
stress shocks are more detrimental to domestic 
industrial output during high than low financial 
stress regimes. Our results complement their 
findings by illustrating that the result holds true, 
not only for the recessionary regime, but also 
for the non-recessionary regime. The results of 
the regime-dependent response of inflation to 
a financial stress shock is also in line with the 
existing literature on the domestic transmission 
of financial stress shocks (e.g. Kremer, 2016a).
US financial stress shocks are detrimental 
to the unemployment rate in the euro area, 
but the effect seems to be independent of the 
regime, which is in contrast to the findings 
reported in the related literature on the effect 
of uncertainty shocks on unemployment (see, 
e.g., Caggiano et al. (2017) for US domestic 
unemployment effects and Caggiano et al. 
Fig. 3: Response of the US economy to a one standard deviation shock in cisstEA
Source: own
Note: Generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in cisstEA hitting the USA in recessionary and 
non-recessionary period over a 60-month horizon. Median responses and the 68% confidence interval are drawn (dotted 
lines for a non-recessionary regime and shaded areas for a recessionary regime), computed from (3), based on results 
of (1b).
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(2020) for international (Canada and the UK) 
effects of US uncertainty shocks).
Fig. 3 presents the GIRFs (computed by (3), 
based on an estimation of Model (1b). Model 
(1b) was estimated on two lags, indicated by 
Akaike information criteria for Model (2)) of US 
variables to a one standard deviation shock 
to euro area financial stress (cisstEA). There 
is a stark contrast in the US responses to 
a financial stress shock, compared to the euro 
area’s response to a US shock. Only the GIRFs 
for industrial output growth are statistically 
significant, with a maximum contraction of 0.15 
percentage points 11 months after the shock. 
The effect is not dependent on the regime in 
the US economy. It is worth noting that the US 
financial system was isolated from the euro area 
financial stress shocks during the observed 
period, as implied by the GIRF for cisstUS.
Overall, the results of the study are 
indicative of a different transmission of financial 
stress shocks in the euro area and the USA. 
We found that the euro area is susceptible to 
US financial stress shocks. The instabilities in 
the US financial system affect production in 
the euro area. The financial shocks deepen 
euro area recessions, but also lead to 
a reduction in industrial output growth during 
non-recessionary periods. Unemployment and 
inflation follow the business cycle. On the other 
hand, the stability of the US financial system is 
not susceptible to the euro area financial stress 
shocks. However, due to trade ties, financial 
stress in the euro area can lead to industrial 
output contraction due to the effect of euro 
area stress on economic growth in the euro 
area itself, while the responses concerning US 
inflation and unemployment are muted.
In contrast, however, the US economy is 
not immune to domestic financial stress. Fig. 4 
shows the effect of a one standard deviation US 
financial stress shock on the US economy.
The results in Fig. 4 suggest that, in the 
USA, industrial production and unemployment 
are susceptible to domestic financial stress 
shocks, while inflation is not. Differences in 
regimes can be observed: domestic financial 
shocks harm the domestic economy more in 
recessions than during non-recessionary times.
4. Discussion
Our results are broadly in line with the existing 
research. However, beyond the existing 
literature, they demonstrate the strong 
international transmission of financial shocks 
from the USA to the euro area, even under 
a non-recessionary regime. Therefore, they 
suggest that policymakers in the euro area 
and the USA need to carefully monitor financial 
stress, not only at home but also abroad, as 
the shocks spread internationally. The global 
financial crisis and the Great Recession have 
Fig. 4: Response of the US economy to a one standard deviation shock in cisstUS
Source: own
Note: Generalized impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in cisstUS hitting the USA in recessionary and 
non-recessionary periods over a 60-month horizon. Median responses and the 68% confidence interval are drawn (dotted 
lines for a recession regime and shaded areas for a non-recession regime), computed from (3), based on results of (1b).
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shown that both economies are vulnerable to 
domestic and foreign financial stress shocks. 
This study, therefore, highlights the importance 
of the macroprudential supervision of the 
financial system in the euro area and the USA.
Moreover, our results clearly underscore 
the importance of coordination in monetary 
policy between the US and the euro area. While 
this is relatively less important for the USA, it is 
crucial for the euro area. In particular, the ECB 
should pay very close attention to the level of 
stress in the US financial sector broadly and, 
more narrowly, across the US financial markets. 
They are large enough and structured in such 
a way that their disruption transmits to the euro 
area and may have very painful consequences 
for it. Euro area monetary policy should be in 
a position to react quickly and decisively, in 
the case of shocks in the euro area and also 
those that hit the USA, as they will spread to 
the former. The prolonged effects of the Great 
Recession in Europe, as compared to the USA, 
make the point even more poignant.
The euro area continues by building 
a more structured institutional framework 
for further integration of the banking sector 
and, more broadly, financial sector across 
the continent (Beck, 2012). More integrated 
European capital and financial markets, as well 
as banking systems, will, no doubt, be more 
prone to contagion and easier distribution of 
financial shocks. Thus, both the architects of 
the institutions of European financial integration 
and the agencies charged with oversight and 
policy decisions cannot ignore the possible 
effects that originate beyond the area itself.
Besides more extensive banking 
supervision, the nature and speed of stress 
shock transmission is likely to be affected by 
banking consolidation across Europe. The 
sector has seen substantial changes since the 
Great Recession (Pohl & Tortella, 2017). While 
the restructuring and consolidation of Spanish 
and Irish banks has largely been completed, 
developments in troubled Italian and even some 
major German banks indicate that consolidation 
has, by no means, been completed and we may 
expect some further changes.
Similarly, we might expect some changes 
in the dynamics of financial connections due 
to Brexit and an adjustment by major financial 
players to it. Furthermore, trade shocks 
emanating from protectionist policies could 
contribute to changes in the transmission of 
financial shocks. Still, we suspect that our 
basic insight into American financial dominance 
and the transmission of US shocks to Europe 
remains valid, despite these changes, and is 
here to stay for the foreseeable future.
Conclusions
We studied the international transmission of 
shocks to financial stress in the USA and the 
euro area. Expanding on previous research, 
we employed five-variable Bayesian TVAR and 
a data set that included compatible financial 
stress indices for both studied areas. The 
methodology endogenously determined the two 
regimes for industrial production: recessionary 
and non-recessionary. Our results suggest 
that the financial stress in the USA transmits 
internationally under both regimes and 
contributes to a drop in production and a hike 
in unemployment in the euro area. Moreover, 
they confirm that the reaction of production 
growth, unemployment, inflation and financial 
stress is regime-dependent and stronger in 
recessions. In contrast, euro area stress shocks 
do not affect US variables beyond industrial 
production, which is most likely due to the trade 
channel. We suggest that this calls for close 
coordination of monetary policy in both areas 
and careful monitoring of financial stress, both 
at home and abroad.
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